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INTRODUCTION 
In comparison to many of the Chinese and Indian state-owned enterprises examined in this volume, the institutional 
and competitive position of the Baosteel Group is somewhat unique. First, Baosteel stands out as one of the major 
success stories of recent Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform. Created as a national steel champion by the 
Chinese government in the early years of the reform period, and benefiting from the industrial policy support this 
status has brought during the intervening three decades, Baosteel has earned the status of one of China’s most 
internationally competitive SOEs. However, Baosteel is also unique in that it does not dominate the Chinese steel 
sector. Accounting for only a small share of Chinese steel production, Baosteel’s position is one of a technological 
leader within a competitive market structure populated by a large ‘national champions group’ of SOEs. Moreover, 
Baosteel has also faced special obligations to implement national  industrial policies, by acting as a technological 
leader tasked with the role of acquiring and upgrading ailing steelmakers. Understanding Baosteel’s position within 
the Chinese steel sector as a ‘national champion amongst national champions’ is critical to explaining its operational 
characteristics, its special relationship with the Chinese government, and the benefits and costs this has carried for the 
firm. 
 
This chapter examines how Baosteel’s position as a national champion amongst national champions has structured 
the institutional and operational characteristics of the firm, and how these have influenced the sustainability of its 
growth trajectory. It begins by reviewing the firm’s origins – as China’s first modern steel enterprise and national steel 
champion – during the early years of the Deng economic reforms. It then examines the development of Baosteel’s 
current system of corporate governance during a period of liberalising reforms in the 1990s – under which the firm 
gained significant operational autonomy, albeit reliant upon discretionary industrial policy support  and 
circumscribed by close state supervision. It finally considers Baosteel’s role during a period of crisis in the Chinese 
steel sector in the 2000s, which has seen a reversal of state policy for the industry back towards a more interventionist 
stance. During this period, Baosteel has benefited from state financial support to rapidly expand its operations, but 
has also been tasked with a special (and sometimes onerous) policy role to upgrade ailing steel firms. Through this 
analysis, it is argued that  while  Baosteel  has  achieved  operational independence from the Chinese government, 
industrial policy constraints associated with its institutional status as a national champion mean its autonomy remains 
circumscribed. As a result, Baosteel remains somewhere between the position of being a market-oriented economic   2 
actor and policy-oriented state actor – a role that has brought both benefits and costs for the firm’s development and 
sustainability. 
 
CREATING A MODERN NATIONAL CHAMPION, 1980S 
Like most of China’s contemporary state-owned enterprises, Baosteel’s origins lie at the beginning of the country’s 
post-socialist economic reform period. Following the replacement of command administration with the liberalising 
‘open door’ and ‘market socialism’  reform policies from  December 1978, the Chinese economy began what has 
become a three-decade period of industrialisation and high-speed growth. Similar to the experience of other newly-
industrialising economies such as Taiwan and Korea, the role of  steel as a critical upstream input for the 
industrialisation process meant the industry would necessarily come to play a major part in China’s post-1978 
economic miracle. Initially, however, the steel industry proved a major difficulty for the Chinese reformers, who 
inherited from the planning period a small-scale and technologically backward industry. Having been constructed 
with Soviet aid during the 1950s, all of China’s major steelworks were decades old; and the industry’s technological 
development was then retarded by the withdrawal of Soviet technical assistance following the Sino-Soviet rift of 1960. 
Subsequent attempts at modernising the industry during the Cultural Revolution were hampered by Mao’s national 
security-motivated ‘Third Front’ construction program, which called for a decentralised industry and saw small-scale 
(and relatively inefficient) steel mills built in each of China’s twenty-nine provinces (Sugimoto 1993).  
 
This fractured and technologically backward industry was unable to provide the mass quantities of steel required for 
China’s industrialisation program, but in the early years of reform the state lacked the financial resources to itself 
launch an expansion and modernisation program in full. Nonetheless, as industrialisation began to take off in labour-
intensive industries due to the open door reforms, domestic demand for steel quickly rose. In the absence of local 
production expansion this produced a massive surge in steel imports – from 11% to 35% of consumption between 
1980 and 1985 – which became a major drain on China’s then-limited foreign exchange reserves (Sugimoto 1993: 264). 
Unable to ignore steel in its reform program for balance of payments reasons, the Chinese state was forced to quickly 
modernise the industry and increase steel production. 
 
It was within this context of a pressing need for import-substituting steel development that Baosteel was created to 
function as China’s first ‘modern’ steel mill. The initial proposal to establish the enterprise – at the time called the 
Baoshan Iron & Steel works – was approved by the State Council in March 1978. Unlike China’s other dated steel mills, 
the Baoshan project  was a  large-scale and modern works  from the outset,  and was designed to function as a 
technological model for the rest of the industry. Modelled on the state-of-the-art Kimitsu works of Japan’s Nippon 
Steel, the mill was built using Japanese engineers and imported equipment at a coastal site in the Baoshan district of 
North Shanghai (Cohen 2005). The project was initially planned in three stages: a first to install an ‘integrated’ steel 
production line (combining both primary steel production and finishing mills) by 1985; a second to install additional 
high technology finishing equipment by 1993; and a third to expand its total capacity to 11 million tonnes per annum 
(mtpa) by 2001 (Sun 2005: 179-180).  
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Baoshan’s size and sophistication made it an ambitious project requiring large state financial outlays, and it was the 
only new steel project supported by the state at the time. Given scarcities of capital, the Chinese government largely 
ignored steel in the first of its reform period economic plans (the Sixth Plan, 1981-85), which prioritised light export 
industries for which high levels of state financing would not be necessary (Xin & Findlay 1985: 22). In fact, the 
Baoshan project was actually suspended by the  State Council due to cost blowouts in 1980, and was only 
recommenced in 1981 when it became apparent that abandoning the project would prove more expensive than 
continuing (Etienne et al. 1992: 124). The state’s commitment to Baoshan as a ‘national champion’ enterprise would 
finally be cemented in the Seventh Plan (1986-90) – in which national policy changed direction to reprioritise heavy 
industries, and saw Baoshan’s high technology second stage earmarked as the flagship project for the steel sector 
(Department of Trade 1985).  
 
The importance of the Chinese government’s financial commitment to Baoshan as a technological model in the early 
1980s is brought into sharp relief when compared to policy for the rest of the steel industry. Unable to directly fund 
any other new steel projects due to capital shortages, the Chinese state instead sought to increase production through 
a program of ‘renovating’ existing works. This was achieved by partial marketisation under the ‘contract 
responsibility system’ (CRS) for SOE management, first trialled for Shougang Steel in 1981, and extended to the rest of 
the Chinese steel industry in 1984-85  (Steinfeld  1998). Under the CRS, autonomy over operational production 
decisions was for the first time devolved to enterprise managers, which in turn ‘contracted’ with the Ministry of 
Metallurgy (MMI) over production goals. These contracts translated national-level planning targets to the firm-level 
by specifying output and profit remittance targets, which would increase at a set rate (usually 5-8%) each year (Byrd 
1992). However, the CRS was designed to also encourage growth beyond the plan targets – by allowing firms to sell 
any above-plan output onto newly established steel markets separate to the planning system, and retain all associated 
profits with such open market sales which could then be reinvested into capacity expansions (Chen 1995). As an 
import-substitution policy, the CRS was also backed by the extension of trade protection, with a 33% tariff and a trade 
licensing system deployed during the mid-1980s as a means to protect the nascent steel industry from foreign imports 
(Nolan 1998: 45). In terms of expanding output and substituting imports at low cost to the state, the CRS program was 
a major success – with steel investment surging seven-fold by the early 1990s and production increasing to at least 
match burgeoning domestic demand (Table 1).  
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Table 1 Growth in the Chinese steel industry, 1981-2009 (million tonnes per annum) 
 
Baoshan I&S  Baosteel 
Group 
Chinese National Steel Indicators 
Production 
Apparent 
Consumption 
Net Trade 
Balance 
Investment* 
1981-85^  NA    40.6  50.1  -9.5  18.1 
1986-90^  NA    59.2  68.3  -9.1  30.2 
1991-95^  7.3    85.9  98.2  -12.3  51.2 
1996-00^  9.7  16.7#  115.4  125.5  -10.1  43.6 
2001  10.6  19.1  151.6  164.1  -12.5  50.5 
2002  11.6  19.5  182.2  201.2  -19.0  68.6 
2003  11.5  19.9  222.3  252.5  -30.2  138.0 
2004  11.9  21.4  272.8  287.9  -15.1  170.6 
2005  18.4  22.7  355.8  361.1  -5.3  221.0 
2006  18.9  22.5  421.0  396.5  24.5  218.1 
2007  19.1  28.6  489.7  444.0  45.7  201.5 
2008  19.6  35.4  512.3  468.5  43.8  232.8 
2009  20.2  38.8  577.1  570.1  7.0  235.3 
Source: Author’s calculations from (China Steel Yearbook, various years) 
* Real RMB billions, calculated using Chinese GDP deflator (2000 = 100) 
^ Annual averages 
# Inclusive of the years 1998-2000 only. 
 
 
Though Baoshan was eventually moved onto the CRS – obtaining its first ‘contract’ in 1987 (Sugimoto 1993: 277) – its 
institutional status as a designated  national champion offered it several advantages over the other enterprises 
included in the program. First, Baoshan lacked the outdated facilities or extensive social welfare burdens that other 
steel firms inherited from the planning period. Investment was also  concentrated in equipment producing 
sophisticated steel products required by downstream industries (such as the automobile, machinery and packaging 
sectors), which at the time few other firms were capable of manufacturing (Nolan 2001a: 638). Second, as a state-
supported project its expansion was not reliant on the low levels of retained earnings available through the CRS, but 
was instead directly financed through policy loans from state banks. Indeed, the state’s financial commitment to 
Baoshan was extensive, and by 2001 some RMB 117 billion had been invested. This investment was equivalent to 52% 
of new capital works spending and 23% of all investment made in the industry during this period, despite Baoshan 
accounting for only a small share (7%) of national production by its completion1
 
. Heavy state-financed investment in 
modern equipment allowed Baoshan to become dominant in Chinese markets for high value finished products such 
as automotive sheet, with the result that by the early 1990s Baoshan had become the first (and only) Chinese firm 
technologically capable of competing in global markets for advanced steel products (Sugimoto, 1993). 
                                                            
1 Author’s calculations, from (Nolan 2007: 89; China Steel Yearbook, various years).   5 
CORPORATISATION AND AUTONOMY UNDER STATE SUPERVISION, 1990S 
While state financial commitments guaranteed that Baoshan would become a modern and competitive enterprise, the 
performance of other Chinese steel SOEs during the CRS period was mixed at best. Notwithstanding its success in 
increasing production, regulatory weaknesses and poor incentive structures meant growth in the broader industry 
faced two major challenges. First, though the CRS provided firms with strong financial incentives to increase steel 
production, it offered none to upgrade technology or ensure products were of the correct mix required by consumers. 
This resulted in an excess of easily manufactured low-value steel alongside  national shortages of higher-value 
finished products (Sugimoto 1993: 269). Second, while the CRS allowed firms to retain profits, it did not devolve 
responsibility for financial losses occurring as a result of the excess production of low-value products. These losses 
were automatically absorbed by the state banking system (Hassard et al. 1999: 65), and by the mid-1990s the debts 
owed by steel mills had grown to unsustainable levels several times larger than the nominal ‘profits’ being declared 
(Steinfeld 1998: 114).  
 
In the 1990s, these problems became sufficiently acute that the Chinese state developed a new strategy for the steel 
industry. It abandoned the CRS in favour of a new set of liberalising SOE reforms, which included three interrelated 
and coordinated  elements:  corporate governance reforms to extend more autonomy to state-owned steel firms; 
industrial policy support to modernise the wider industry; and bureaucratic reform to the state’s regulatory 
institutions for the industry. These reforms would prove significant for Baoshan, which developed a new relationship 
with the Chinese state as a preferentially supported technological leader amongst a newly formed and broader group 
of steel national champions. 
 
The first element of the 1990s liberalising reforms involved the extension of greater autonomy to state-owned steel 
enterprises. Marketisation proper began in 1993 with the cancellation of the CRS and its replacement with a new 
‘modern enterprise system’ (MES) for SOE management, which sought to resolve the problems associated with partial 
enterprise autonomy (Green & Liu  2005). In the steel industry, the MES involved three distinct but interrelated 
elements. First, firms were devolved full operational autonomy, including financial responsibility for all profits and 
losses (Hassard et al. 1999: 78). Some RMB 62 billion of non-performing loans run-up during the CRS period were then 
absorbed into the state banking system through a series of debt-to-equity swaps in the late 1990s to put the industry 
on a secure financial basis (Taube & in der Heiden 2009: 82). Second, national steel planning was terminated when the 
last of the CRS contracts expired in 1997 (Tse 1997: 17), with all steel sales from that point on occurring on open 
markets and for the first time fully exposing steelmakers to market disciplines. Third, enterprise management was 
corporatised through a series of corporate governance reforms adopted from 1992. Under these reforms, SOEs were 
reorganised as ‘group companies’ –  with a parent company holding shares in a series of subsidiaries organised 
around the enterprise’s main activities –  and independent Boards of Directors were established to exercise 
management functions separate from the state. Nonetheless, associated personnel rules which mandated that CCP 
officials should hold all top management positions ensured that state oversight of the enterprises was maintained (if 
indirectly) following corporatisation (Bai & Bennington 2007). As a result of the MES, by 2000 the Chinese steel 
industry had become fully independent of the national planning system both financially and operationally, albeit still 
subject to ‘oversight’ by the Party through personnel linkages. 
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The second component of the 1990s reforms sought to address the industry’s technological deficiencies by extending 
preferential industrial policy support to a larger group of national champions than just Baoshan. This began under the 
Ninth Plan of 1996, when the Chinese government abandoned its prior policy of decentralised industrial development 
in favour of a new program referred to as “grasp the large, let go of the small” (Zheng & Chen 2007). The policy involved 
a commitment to a process of consolidation under ongoing state ownership for heavy industries considered a strategic 
part of the national economy, and the privatisation of all remaining non-strategic sectors and small-scale firms (Green 
& Liu 2005: 20-25). As steel was amongst the industries to be ‘grasped’ by the state its privatisation was explicitly 
ruled out, and the MMI instead announced a policy to create large-scale steel conglomerates that would act as a 
‘group of national champions’ in 1997. These steel conglomerates were initially formed by preferentially extending 
finance through the state banking system to large SOEs for the purpose of acquiring smaller firms (Sutherland 2001: 
39-66);  following  which their technical modernisation  was  assisted  by  the extension of RMB 75 billion of 
concessionary loans from state-owned banks for technology upgrading projects (Taube & in der Heiden 2009: 81). The 
result of these state-financed consolidation and upgrading efforts was a doubling in the size of the ten largest steel 
SOEs2, and a rapid improvement in the technical sophistication of the industry’s crude steel production3
 
. 
Corporatisation and rationalisation efforts were followed by a third set of bureaucratic reforms that sought to clarify 
the role of the state as both owner and regulator of the industry. The process began in 1998, when the ownership of 
the steel firms was clarified by removing them from the national MMI and awarding ownership of all but four steel 
firms to either their local or provincial governments (Tse 1997: 13). Regulatory authority was also streamlined in 2003, 
when the various Chinese planning bodies were abolished and replaced by two newly formed organisations with a 
clear division of regulatory labour: the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The SASAC’s role was to exercise direct ‘ownership’ functions 
on behalf of the state; and took over issues relating to SOE financing, mergers and managerial appointments. It also 
possessed a somewhat devolved structure, with provincial SASAC branches formed to exercise ownership for firms 
devolved to local governments, and a ‘central’ branch performing this role for the firms retained by the national 
government (Zheng & Chen 2007). Conversely, the NDRC’s role was to act as a national planning body, setting broad 
industrial goals which were then to be implemented at a firm level at the discretion of the various SASAC branches; 
though it also retained powers covering the loan activities of state banks (Voss et al. 2008: 4). The effect of these 
bureaucratic reforms was to achieve a separation between the state’s ownership (SASAC) and regulatory (NDRC) 
functions over the steel industry, notwithstanding the ongoing dominance of state ownership and Party control of 
managerial appointments. 
 
Following the completion of the liberalising reforms in the early 2000s, the Chinese steel industry entered a period of 
extremely rapid growth. While in part the result of liberalising reforms which devolved operational autonomy to 
now-independent firm managers, this growth was also associated with China entering a second ‘heavy’ phase of 
industrial development, which saw rapidly increasing demand for steel from the construction, machinery and 
automobile industries (Rothman 2005). The industry began booming from 2000, and by the end of the decade Chinese 
                                                            
2 During the 1990s, the average size of the top-ten Chinese steelmakers doubled from 3.7 to 6.3 mtpa, and by 2000 the group accounted for some 
50% of national production. Author’s calculations, from (China Steel Yearbook, various years). 
3 During the 1990s, the industry obsoleted open-hearth steelmaking technology in favour of the modern basic-oxygen furnace, and achieved almost 
universal adoption of continuous casting process technology (Movshuk 2005: 68-69).    7 
steel consumption had quadrupled, production increased five-fold, real investment increased six-fold, and the 
country shifted from being a net steel importer to a major exporter (Table 1). The boom also quickly catapulted the 
Chinese industry to a position of unprecedented global dominance –  rising from a 15% share of world steel 
production in 2000 to 47% by 2009 (WSA 2010).  
 
However, due to the expansion of state industrial policy support to the broader group of steel SOEs during the 1990s 
reforms, Baoshan acquired a new status and role within the industry. Baoshan went from being a state-supported 
technological model  to  now  become a national champion  amongst  national champions  –  a change in status that 
ushered in a new relationship between the firm  and the state. Under this new relationship, the state retained 
particularly close control of Baoshan’s management; and while it continued to extend discretionary policy support, 
now also required Baoshan to undertake special industrial policy functions reflective of its leading technological 
position within the industry. 
 
First, from the mid-1990s state financial assistance to Baoshan became conditional upon the firm assisting technology-
related industrial policy efforts in the industry. Baoshan was among the first firms to be corporatised under the MES, 
when it was selected in 1994 as a trial enterprise for corporate governance reform. Baoshan was also the sole steel firm 
included in a 1997 policy that named six SOEs (across a range of strategic industrial sectors) selected for industrial 
policy support to become world standard (Hassard  et al.  2007: 97); and in 1999 received RMB 17 billion of 
concessionary loans from state banks to fund technology projects associated with this goal (Taube & in der Heiden 
2009: 81). However, this discretionary policy support also came with obligations to assist the state’s consolidation and 
technical upgrading efforts. In 1998, the MMI arranged for Baoshan to merge with and then upgrade two smaller 
Shanghai steel mills –  Shanghai  Metallurgical and Meishan I&S  (Hogan 1999: 15). Both  firms were ailing, with 
outmoded technology and heavy social welfare obligations, which placed burdens on Baoshan to cover their welfare 
costs and finance technical modernisations. However (and despite misgivings from Baoshan’s management), given 
the attendant financial largesse from the state the firm had little choice but to undertake the merger (Sun 2005: 181). 
Importantly, no other steel firm was forced to absorb ailing mills during this period, making this technology-
upgrading function a role uniquely required of Baoshan. 
 
Following its  1998 mergers,  the full corporatisation of the firm was then  undertaken when the  Baosteel Group 
Corporation was formed in 2000. The Baosteel Group was designed to act as a 100% state-owned parent company, 
which would facilitate the reorganisation of the Group’s assets as separate subsidiaries: Baoshan, the two smaller 
Shanghai mills, and a range of related service and technology enterprises. This facilitated a capital raising through the 
privatisation of a 15% stake in Baoshan – the most profitable part of the Group – in December 2000 (Sun 2005: 181). 
From this point on, Baosteel’s internal organisation has effectively been partitioned in three: between its Baoshan 
subsidiary (in which the Group’s best steel assets are placed); other less competitive steel enterprises that have been 
acquired through successive mergers; and its related downstream service and technology businesses. The Group 
subsequently reduced its holding in Baoshan to 74% through a series of share issuances designed to raise capital; 
upgraded the Shanghai  mills before transferring their facilities into Baoshan in 2005; and then began acquiring 
majority stakes in a further set of smaller steel firms from 2007. Figure 1 outlines the current ownership arrangements 
within the Baosteel Group.   8 
 
Figure 1 Structure of the Baosteel Group, 2010 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from (Baosteel Group 2011b) 
 
Given Baosteel’s critical technological role within the industry, the state also retained especially close control of the 
firm’s management during the corporatisation  reforms.  In terms of ownership, Baosteel was among the four 
nationally strategic steel firms whose ownership was retained by the central government in 1998, before passing to the 
central SASAC in 2003. At the regulatory level, while an autonomous Board of Directors was established during the 
group restructure of 2000, the autonomy of the Board with respect to the interests of the Party and state has remained 
somewhat circumscribed. First, while a majority of Board members are now external appointees4, Baosteel was one of 
fifty-three central SOEs for which appointment power over the top two management positions was retained by the 
Central Organisation Department  (COD)  of the CCP –  giving the Party control over the firm’s top managerial 
appointments (Sun 2005: 181). Second, as the sole owner of the Group, the central SASAC retains authority over 
“major matters of enterprises” (including mergers, capital raisings, and senior managerial appointments)5, which acts to 
limit the Board’s autonomy to decision-making within the broad strategic parameters determined by the SASAC. 
Third, the majority of Directors are not only Party members but also hold ranking positions within the Party 
hierarchy6
 
; and since 2007 the current Chairman (Xu Lejiang) has been a member of the CCP’s Central Committee 
(Baosteel Group 2011a).  
Importantly, this tight control over Baosteel’s management means that the firm is subject to a higher degree of state 
and Party control than its competitors in the Chinese steel industry. Baosteel is the only steel firm whose managerial 
appointments remain controlled by the COD; and as of 2010 is amongst only three firms whose ownership remains 
with the central SASAC7
                                                            
4 Following Baosteel’s inclusion in a 2005 SASAC pilot project to trial boards comprised mostly of non-company directors (Qin 2007). 
. Indeed, due to the ongoing Party control of appointments and SASAC supervision of the 
firm’s management, recent studies of corporate governance in the Baosteel Group have concluded that: (a) the Party 
5 As per Chapter IV of the Interim Regulations on the Supervision and Management State-owned Assets of Enterprises – (State Council of the People's 
Republic of China 2003). 
6 Of Baosteel’s ten current Directors, seven (including three of its six ‘external’ directors) are Party members; all of which hold formal positions 
within the CCP apparatus. See (Baosteel Group 2011a). 
7 The others being Ansteel and WISCO, the second and third largest Chinese steel firms (SASAC 2009).   9 
effectively controls decision-making within the firm by virtue of its near monopoly on management (Bai & 
Bennington 2007); and (b) its Board of Directors is unable to exercise meaningful influence on the firm’s operations 
independent of the industrial policy priorities of the state (Jia & Tomasic 2010: 127). The result is that Baosteel’s 
management can be best described as possessing ‘circumscribed autonomy’, capable of independent decision making 
though only within the broad parameters laid down by state industrial policies. 
 
While circumscribed autonomy and requirements to assist industrial policy imperatives were the cost of Baosteel’s 
national champion status, concomitant state  financial  assistance  acted as a  major source of the firm’s steadily 
increasing international competitiveness. During the last decade, Baosteel has consistently been the industry’s top 
financial performer, with the gross profit margins in its Baoshan subsidiary (in which its modern facilities are 
concentrated) two to three times higher than the average for other large and medium Chinese steel firms (Table 2). 
The source of this competitiveness is Baoshan’s product mix, which due to longstanding state financial support for 
technology projects is concentrated in the high margin hot-rolled, cold-rolled and tube and pipe product lines. These 
three market segments currently account for 68% of Baoshan’s sales, which compares very favourably to an average of 
19% across the Chinese steel industry8
 
. Technological advantages also allowed Baosteel to become an aggressive 
exporter, with foreign markets accounting for 9.3% of its sales by value in 2009 – well ahead of the national average of 
3.3% (China Steel Yearbook 2010), and one of the few Chinese steel firms export-active in high rather than low value 
product lines. Finally, Baosteel’s rapid growth – with the corporation doubling in size over the last ten years – has also 
seen it become one of the world’s largest steel firms, in 2009 edging out both of its main foreign rivals (Japan’s Nippon 
Steel and Korea’s POSCO) to become the world’s second largest producer by output (WSA  2009).  Thus,  a 
longstanding pattern of state support for high-technology projects has ensured Baosteel has become both the Chinese 
industry’s most competitive enterprise, and the most (if not only) firm capable of competing with steel multinationals 
in international markets for sophisticated and high value-added finished steel products (Nolan 2007; Sun 2007). 
Table 2 Financial performance of Baoshan I&S and Chinese steel industry, 2003-2009 (RMB millions) 
  Baoshan Iron and Steel Co.  Key Large and Medium Steel Mills 
 
Operating 
Profit 
Total Sales  Profit/Sales 
Operating 
Profit 
Total Sales  Profit/Sales 
2003  10049  44460  22.6%  55762  713434  7.8% 
2004  13442  58638  22.9%  93405  1104504  8.5% 
2005  17451  98545  17.7%  80997  1316055  6.2% 
2006  18984  117603  16.1%  103543  1554246  6.7% 
2007  19477  136360  14.3%  164617  2069997  8.0% 
2008  8304  150529  5.5%  88076  2703012  3.3% 
2009  5887  116288  5.1%  53417  2418712  2.2% 
Source: Author’s calculations, from (Baoshan Iron and Steel, Annual Reports 2003-2009; China Steel Yearbook, various 
years) 
 
STEEL CRISIS, ACTIVIST INTERVENTION AND SPECIAL POLICY FUNCTIONS FOR BAOSTEEL, 2000S 
While the liberalising reforms of the 1990s laid the regulatory groundwork for rapid steel growth, emerging problems 
for the industry have in fact characterised the latter half of the 2000s as a period of crisis rather than success. Chief 
                                                            
8 Author’s calculations, from (Baoshan Iron and Steel 2009: 28; China Steel Yearbook 2010).   10 
amongst these is the industry’s technical capacity to compete with foreign steelmakers in a newly deregulated trade 
environment, which has threatened the ongoing sustainability of the industry’s recent high-speed growth. From 2005, 
this challenge catalysed a third phase of steel reform policies by the Chinese government, this time designed to 
improve the industry’s competitive position in world markets by consolidating the relatively competitive steel market 
into a more oligopolistic form. The state’s policy responses since 2005 have also reversed the prior trend of gradual 
liberalisation, in favour of a reassertion of state leadership through aggressive industrial policy interventions. 
Importantly, given Baosteel’s institutional status as the industry’s national champion and technological leader, the 
firm has again been anointed to play a special policy function as an agent of technical upgrading during this period of 
heightened state involvement in the industry. 
 
The primary difficulty for the Chinese steel industry during the 2000s boom has been its poorly concentrated market 
structure. Despite the objectives of the grasp the large policy, the industry has remained poorly consolidated, and is 
presently characterised by a four-tier structure (outlined in Table 3). Its bottom tier – comprised of several thousand 
former township-and-village enterprises –  is very small in scale, uses  outdated technologies,  and is largely 
economically unviable. Growth has instead been driven by two other groups of firms.  A third tier of seventy-three 
medium-sized ‘key enterprises’, which account for around 40% of national production, and are of a sufficient size for 
economic viability but face ongoing deficiencies in comparison to world technological standards. Above these, a 
second tier comprised of the ‘top-10’ firms produce another 40% of national production. These top-10 firms are the 
largest and most technologically sophisticated enterprises, and comprise the national champions group that has been 
the major recipient of state policy assistance in recent years9
 
. As the largest firm and technological leader, Baosteel sits 
alone in a first tier of this institutional structure. In terms of output, however, Baosteel is only a small player within 
either the national champions group or the industry as a whole, accounting for only 6.7% of national and 15.6% of 
top-ten crude steel production in 2009. Thus, the Chinese steel sector is currently characterised by a relatively un-
concentrated  and competitive type of institutional structure, within which Baosteel plays only a minor (albeit 
technologically important) role. 
Table 3 Structure of Chinese steel industry, 2009 
 
Number of 
firms 
Average 
size (mtpa) 
Share of national 
production 
Description 
First Tier: 
Baosteel Group 
1  38.8  6.7% 
Designated national champion; technological 
leader in high-value finished products 
Second Tier: 
National 
champions 
Top 10 
(2nd  – 10th) 
23.4  36.5% 
Main recipients of industrial policy targeting; 
large-scale and technologically efficient 
enterprises; predominantly SOEs 
Third Tier: 
Key enterprises 
Top 73 
(11th – 73rd) 
3.6  39.0% 
Medium size upwards; sufficient scale for 
viability but some ongoing technical 
deficiencies; mix of SOEs and private firms 
Fourth Tier: 
Small firms 
Approx. 11800  Very small  17.8% 
Ex-TVEs; small-scale backyard operations; 
most economically unviable 
Source: Author’s summary, from (China Steel Yearbook 2010; OECD 2006; Sun 2007) 
 
                                                            
9 Industrial policy targeting of the top-ten firms began with the Tenth Plan (2001-2005), which called for the group to produce 80% of national 
output by 2005 (Sun 2007: 605); and was subsequently reinforced by similar targeting in national steel industry policies issued in 2005 (NDRC 2005) 
and 2010 (Steel Guru 2010b)   11 
This fractured market structure has proven a major difficulty for the Chinese steel industry during its boom over the 
last decade, as the industry lacks the levels of consolidation and enterprise-level scales  necessary to compete 
effectively in global steel markets. As late as 2004, even the national champions group was comparatively small by 
international standards (at about one-third the average size of international MNCs10
 
); and only five Chinese firms had 
achieved the ‘minimum efficient scale’ for integrated steel production, estimated to be around 8 mtpa (Sun 2007: 603). 
As a result (and with the exception of Baosteel), the industry lacked the capabilities to cost-effectively produce the 
high-value  speciality  steel products increasingly in demand from its automobile and machinery sectors. Its low 
technology levels also mean that despite rapidly growing exports, it has only proven competitive in world markets for 
low-value,  semi-finished  bulk steel lines (OECD 2006: 14).  Thus, and despite the success implied by rapidly 
expanding production, weak consolidation means the international competitiveness  of the Chinese steel industry 
remains laggard. 
These low levels of international competitiveness proved doubly problematic due to the dismantling of import-
substituting trade protections,  which began  in the 1990s and culminated in China’s World Trade Organisation 
accession in 2001. All forms of tariff protection, trade licensing and production and export subsidies for the industry 
were removed11
Table 2
, for the first time directly exposing the industry to competition with international MNCs in its home 
market. While booming demand compensated for poor international competitiveness in the early years of the decade, 
the industry’s frailty was fully exposed when world steel demand and prices slumped during the 2008-09 global 
financial crisis. By late 2008, 60% of Chinese steelmakers were declaring losses (Steel Guru 2008a); and profitability 
amongst the key enterprises collapsed, falling from a peak of 8.5% of sales revenue in 2004 to 2.2% in 2009 ( ). 
Despite its focus on high value-added product lines even Baosteel was affected, with Baoshan’s gross profit margins 
collapsing from 14.3% in 2007 to 5.1% by 2009 – albeit a rate still relatively healthy when compared to the rest of the 
industry. In early 2009 the industry was officially declared to be in crisis, which both the government and industry 
officials  publicly attributed to the combined effects of the financial crisis and the firms’  low  international 
competitiveness (Steel Guru 2009d).  
 
Somewhat unsurprisingly given the  strategic importance  of steel to China’s development program,  the state 
responded by abandoning its previous strategy of gradual liberal reform in favour of a reassertion of governmental 
control over the industry. Recognition that the unconcentrated market structure was problematic first occurred in 
2003, when the NDRC issued a report that argued steel production was rising too quickly in too many firms, and 
proposed bringing the investment approval process back under central government control  (NDRC  2003). This 
proposal was then adopted in July 2005, when the State Council officially endorsed the NDRC’s Iron and Steel Industry 
Development Policy (NDRC 2005). This policy outlined a strategy of coordinated interventions in the steel industry, 
which aimed to transform the structure of the industry from a competitive to an oligopolistic form, so as to promote 
consolidation and technical upgrading amongst the national champion group of enterprises. Specifically, the 2005 
Steel Policy called for:  
 
                                                            
10 In 2004, the average size of the top-ten Chinese mills was 11.9 mtpa, compared to 30.7 mtpa for the world’s ten largest non-Chinese firms. 
Author’s calculations, from (China Steel Yearbook 2006; IISI 2007). 
11 As per Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and Annex 2A of China’s WTO accession protocol. See (WTO 2001).   12 
-  Consolidation – through planning targets that called for the top-ten firms to produce 50% of national steel 
output by 2010 and 70% by 2020 (Article 3). To achieve this, the NDRC reassumed investment approval 
powers from the central and provincial SASACs, which would be used to prohibit expansion of small and 
medium firms by only approving new projects meeting certain size thresholds (Articles 12 and 22). 
-  Technical upgrading  –  by  using investment approval powers to  require  steel firms to  shift investment 
patterns away from production expansion in favour of the ‘scrap-and-rebuild’ replacement of old equipment 
with new facilities. (Article 10). 
-  Mergers – by encouraging the large firms to pursue “concentration through coalition, cross-share holding, merger 
and restructuring”. To support mergers, the NDRC would use its approval powers over the activities of state-
owned banks to withhold credit for capacity expansions to the industry. Instead, credit would be rationed 
toward the large industry leaders for the purpose of acquiring medium-sized firms (i.e. those in the third-tier 
key enterprise group) (Articles 20 and 25). 
 
The NDRC’s 2005 Steel Policy was critically significant for the steel industry as a whole. It laid out plans to shift the 
industry from a competitive to oligopolistic market structure; and reversed the previous trend of a gradually reducing 
role for the state in favour of activist industrial policy interventions. Taken together, the initiatives called for a state-
orchestrated acquisition-then-upgrading process, under which the more efficient top-10 national champions would first 
merge with, and then technologically upgrade, medium-sized firms from the key enterprises group. Its goals were 
reinforced when the NDRC’s ‘Steel Revitalisation Plan’ was approved by the State Council as an emergency measure 
following the 2009 financial crisis – which awarded the industry a further RMB 15 billion of subsidised loans for 
technology upgrading projects;  and saw the NDRC commit to undertake a brokering  function  with provincial 
government owners, aimed to smooth the way for cross-provincial steel mergers (Steel Guru 2009a; Xinhua 2009). 
 
The shift toward activist policy intervention to foster oligopoly also proved significant for Baosteel, as the firm was 
again delegated a special policy implementation role by the NDRC reflective of its leading technological position 
within the industry. First, Baosteel was implicitly named as a merger leader in the 2005 Steel Policy, which called for 
the creation of two 30 mtpa firms by 2010 through state-orchestrated mergers (NDRC 2005: Article 20). This state-
anointed policy role was then formalised in the Steel Revitalisation Plan of 2009, under which Baosteel was explicitly 
named as a firm that should lead the acquisition-then-upgrading process that was being intensified in the wake of the 
financial crisis (Steel Guru 2009a). The State Council and NDRC’s joint decision to delegate this function to Baosteel 
demonstrates a reprising of the firm’s policy role of the late 1990s, under which its status as a national champion 
carried concomitant obligations to act as an agent promoting industrial policy goals for the  broader  industry. 
Importantly, an analysis of Baosteel’s record in performing this acquisition-then-upgrading function shows that this 
obligated role has carried both benefits and costs for the firm’s growth pattern. 
 
Associated with its new  policy  role, Baosteel enjoyed a  new round of  discretionary state financial support to 
undertake a set of merger-driven expansions from 2005. Financial support was offered to the firm by channelling 
concessionary loan finance through the state-owned banking system – either through state-owned policy banks that 
provide ‘policy finance’ on concessionary rates for state-targeted investments (Bonin & Huang, 2001); or through 
state-owned commercial banks whose purpose is to finance SOE activities in line with state-mandated industrial plans   13 
(Cousin 2007; Podpiera 2006). First, in the immediate wake of the 2005 Steel Policy Baoshan enjoyed a tripling of its 
loan finance from state-owned banks (from RMB 4.7 to 12.5 billion) (Baoshan Iron and Steel 2005). These loans were 
augmented in 2009-10 when the Baosteel Group was extended lines-of-credit with a combined value of RMB 140 
billion by three state-owned banks, earmarked to fund acquisitions and technology projects12
 
. Baosteel also benefited 
from a de facto capital infusion of RMB 15 billion from the state, occurring as a result of the central SASAC 
purchasing 60% of a Baoshan stock issuance made by the Group in 2005 (Baoshan Iron and Steel 2005).  
Demonstrating the sensitivity of Baosteel’s management to state imperatives (given personnel linkages between its 
Board and the Party), the firm quickly responded to its new policy role. First, Baoshan doubled the value of its new 
project investment spending (largely concentrated in new technology projects) in 2005 (Baoshan Iron and Steel 2005); 
and the Group announced a new rapid growth strategy that called for a tripling of Baosteel size to 80 mtpa by 2012 
(Baosteel Group  2007). The Group also launched a series of merger initiatives from 2006, which resulted in the 
acquisition and upgrading of four medium-sized SOEs  –  70% of Xinjiang Bayi in 2007, 80% of a joint venture 
combining two Guangzhou mills in 2008, and 56% of Zhejiang Ningbo in 2009 (see Table 4). This quick succession of 
state-financed mergers ushered in a period of unprecedented growth for Baosteel, which almost doubled in size from 
22.5 to 38.8 mtpa in the three years to 2009 alone. Baoshan’s new technology projects also allowed for continued 
improvement in its product mix after 2005, largely exiting the low-value billet market while increasing its production 
of hot- and cold-rolled products by 35% and doubling its stainless steel capacity13
 
.  Finally, rapid merger-led growth 
also allowed Baosteel to quickly jump up the ranking of international steel producers, climbing from the world’s sixth 
largest firm by output in 2005 to second by 2009. 
Table 4 Merger initiatives of Baosteel Group, 1998-2010 
Merger target  Year  Size (mtpa) 
Share 
acquired 
Process/Outcome 
Shanghai Metallurgical / 
Meishan I&S 
1998  5.9  100%  Administrative transfer 
Handan I&S  2006  9.5  Failed  Blocked by Hebei government 
Xinjiang Bayi  2007  4.0  69.7% 
48.5% share transfer; 21.2% acquired for RMB 3 
billion 
Guangzhou Steel / 
Shaoguan Steel 
2008  7.2  80% 
Share transfer in exchange for Baosteel 
contributing RMB 28 billion to new project 
Pangang  2008  7.5  Failed 
Central SASAC awards merger rights to 
Ansteel 
Zhejiang Ningbo  2009  4.0  56%  Cost of RMB 2 billion 
Magang  2009  14.8  Failed  Blocked by Anhui government 
Baotou  2010  10.0  Failed  Blocked by Inner Mongolian government 
Source: Author’s compilation, from (American Metals Market 2007; Caijing 2006; China Economic Net 2008; Financial 
Times 2008; Steel Guru 2008b, 2009b, 2009e, 2010a). 
 
However, while state-financed mergers allowed Baosteel to expand rapidly, its policy obligations have precluded 
other expansion initiatives that would have resulted in a more amenable growth trajectory. First, policy restrictions 
                                                            
12 Author’s compilation, from (Steel Guru 2009c, 2009f, 2010d; Business Week 2010). 
13 Author’s calculations, from (Baoshan Iron and Steel 2005, 2009).   14 
have meant Baosteel’s four acquisition-then-upgrading mergers have been sub-optimal from the perspective of the 
firm  itself. The firms Baosteel was able to acquire were all comparatively small third tier enterprises  that  were 
financially underperforming. These firms were also in need of extensive technological upgrading, requiring Baosteel 
to commit to major capital works to improve the acquired plants. However, independent initiatives launched by 
Baosteel’s management to merge with larger and more efficient steel mills – which would not impose such upgrading 
costs  –  were  on repeated occasions blocked by state regulators. Three attempts by Baosteel to merge with large 
‘technological peers’ were vetoed by provincial governments concerned with the impact that losing ownership (and 
hence firm profits) would have on government finances. These vetoes occurred  despite the NDRC’s public 
commitment to broker agreement with provincial governments in such situations; and given many of Baosteel 
competitors have successfully executed cross-provincial mergers14
 
  due to active support and brokerage from the 
NDRC suggests its support for the vetoed proposals were relatively weak. In a fourth case, a Baosteel initiative to 
merge with Pangang (a firm with highly developed capacity in tube steel products) was scuttled when the central 
SASAC  instead  appointed  acquisition rights to Ansteel, Baosteel’s major domestic competitor (Steel Guru  2008b). 
While no official explanation was provided for this decision, it was understood to be motivated by the goal of to 
strengthening Ansteel’s competitiveness to levels comparable with Baosteel (Bloomberg 2009). Importantly, the vetoing 
of mergers has been specific to Baosteel (as no other Chinese steel firm has had a merger blocked since the 2005 Steel 
Policy); and reflects the fact that Baosteel’s industrial policy function since 2005 has been to acquire ailing third-tier 
enterprises rather than its second-tier technological peers. 
Second, since reassuming investment approval powers the NDRC has  also  prohibited Baosteel from using its 
concessionary state finance for either internal expansion or the development of new projects. Very little capacity 
expansion (only 1.8 mtpa) occurred in its Baoshan subsidiary since 2005, which the firm itself has explained was due 
to the provisions in the Steel Policy prohibiting the expansion of existing steel works (Baoshan Iron and Steel 2008: 
34). Additionally, in 2009 the NDRC refused Baosteel permission to develop a new 10 mtpa plant at Zhanjiang, which 
the Group had intended to act as a second high technology project to complement its Baoshan works (Steel Guru 
2009g). Again, such vetoes were related to policy imperatives that it focus on the upgrading of ailing competitors 
rather than internal expansion, and appear to be somewhat specific to Baosteel – as only one other steel firm (WISCO) 
has had an investment project cancelled by the NDRC since the 2005 Steel Policy was announced. 
 
Thus, while Baosteel’s post-2005 growth has been extremely rapid due to state financial support, the trajectory has 
nonetheless been sub-optimal from the perspective of the firm itself. The firm’s policy role as an acquisition-then-
upgrading leader has resulted in regulatory vetoes for management initiatives to expand either internally, or via 
merger with technological peers, and has forced Baosteel to grow by merger with underperforming third-tier firms. 
Indeed, the fact that Baosteel’s management attempted to grow the firm through a combination of internal expansion 
and merger with peers demonstrates that the resulting growth trajectory was not the management’s desired outcome, 
but a compromise necessitated to conform to the state’s industrial policy prerogatives. Of course, Baosteel did receive 
discretionary financial support to assist with this role, and remains the Chinese industry’s top performer (both 
technologically and financially) despite the costs imposed by its third-tier  acquisitions. Nonetheless, Baosteel’s 
                                                            
14 Namely, Ansteel’s 2009 acquisitions of Pangang and Benxi (China Daily 2010); and WISCO’s 2008 merger with Luizhou (Xinhua 2008).    15 
resulting growth trajectory has clearly been more consistent with the interests of the state and the broader industry 
(for further dissemination of Baoshan’s technical capabilities)  than the firm itself  (for  competitivness-enhancing 
growth) – and evidently not the management’s first choice in light of its several vetoed growth initiatives. However, it 
has been a necessary quid pro quo, given the firm’s policy function as a technology and merger leader, and the 
concomitant financial benefits this role has brought. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Baosteel’s evolution illustrates a unique trajectory, under which its national champion status has resulted in specific 
features for the firm’s development and relationship with the Chinese state. Baosteel has grown to the position of 
being the leading steel firm in China, and enjoys the status of being one of the few Chinese firms technologically 
capable of competing with global steel giants. However, in large part it owes this position to long-standing patterns of 
governmental support. Baosteel was established as a national champion from the outset, built at high cost by the 
Chinese state as a modern enterprise with world standard equipment. Since that time it has consistently enjoyed the 
benefits of its national champion status – particularly in the form of access to preferential financing from state banks – 
which has allowed the firm to grow rapidly, dominate high value-added niches within the Chinese steel market, and 
financially outperform its SOE peers. Furthermore, Baosteel was corporatised and granted managerial autonomy 
during the corporate governance reforms beginning in the late 1990s. As a result, the formal role for the state in the 
management of the firm has been reduced to that of owner (through the central SASAC) and regulator (the NDRC). 
The Group’s Board of Directors now exercises independent control of the productive and financial operations of the 
enterprise – which now operates within a steel market that is both competitive and international in character. 
 
However, Baosteel’s institutional status as a ‘national champion amongst national champions’ resulted in tight 
government control of the firm. Unlike the experience of other Chinese steel SOEs, Baosteel’s critically important role 
as a technological leader within a poorly concentrated steel sector has seen it: (a) subject to particularly tight Party 
supervision and penetration of management; and (b) face  obligations to absorbing smaller and underperforming 
SOEs. Moreover, since the crisis-induced and heavily interventionist Steel Policy of 2005, the state has again required 
that Baosteel perform policy functions, mandating a growth strategy based on mergers with ailing third-tier firms 
rather than with its technological peers or through internal expansion. This technology-upgrading policy function, 
selectively applied by the state to Baosteel (and only to Baosteel), has taken the form of a quid pro quo obligation 
under which the support enjoyed by the firm  has carried concomitant requirements to implement the state’s 
industrial policies. Furthermore, it demonstrates that while Baosteel’s management has largely achieved operational 
autonomy from the state, institutional constraints mean the firm’s autonomy is at best circumscribed, and subject to 
special governmental control over higher-level strategic decision-making. 
 
Ultimately, this mix of policy-related advantages and obligations has carried both benefits and costs for Baosteel’s 
development. On the one hand, state financial assistance has cemented Baosteel’s position as a world leading steel 
enterprise; and the company’s financial performance remains  sustainable (if nonetheless reduced) since the 2008 
global financial crisis. However, performing a policy role has also carried costs. These costs are particularly evident in 
Baosteel’s recent growth trajectory – which was clearly sub-optimal from the perspective of the company itself – and   16 
demonstrates that national champion status has carried a mix of both positive and negative effects. Moreover, it 
reveals that while corporatisation has delivered Baosteel significant levels of managerial and operational autonomy, 
ongoing regulatory supervision by the state and managerial penetration by the Party has limited the degree to which 
the company can be considered a genuine market actor. Rather, as a national champion amongst national champions, 
Baosteel remains somewhere between the position of being  a  market-responsive  economic actor and a policy-
responsive political actor, and continues to bear both the benefits and costs that this neither fully market- nor state-
controlled position implies. 
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